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Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of memory on the stability of evolutionary selec-
tion dynamics based on a multi-nomial logit model in an asset pricing model
with heterogeneous beliefs. Whether memory is stabilizing or destabilizing
depends in general on three key factors: (1) whether or not the weights on
past observations are normalized; (2) the ecology of forecasting rules, in par-
ticular the average strength of trend extrapolation and the spread in biased
forecasts, and (3) whether or not costs for information gathering of economic
fundamentals have to be incurred.
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11 Introduction
Heterogeneous expectations models are becoming increasingly popular in various
ﬁelds of economic analysis, such as exchange rate models (De Grauwe et al., 1993;
Da Silva, 2001; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2005; 2006), macro-monetary policy
models (Evans and Honkapohja, 2003; Evans and McGough, 2005; Bullard et al.,
2008; Anufriev et al., 2009), overlapping-generations models (Duﬀy, 1994; Tuin-
stra, 2003; Tuinstra and Wagener, 2007) and models of socio-economic behaviour
(Lux, 1995, Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Alfarano et al., 2005). Yet the application
with the most systematic and perhaps most promising heterogeneous expectations
models seems to be asset price modelling. Contributions of e.g. Brock and Hommes
(1998), Lux and Marchesi (1999), LeBaron (2000), Chiarella and He (2002), Brock
et al. (2005) and Gaunersdorfer et al. (2008) demonstrate how a simple standard
asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs is able to lead to complex dynamics
that makes it extremely hard to predict the co-evolution of prices and forecasting
strategies in asset markets. The main framework of analysis of such asset pricing
models constitutes a ﬁnancial market application of the evolutionary selection of
expectation rules, introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997) and called the adap-
tive belief system (ABS). See Hommes (2006) and LeBaron (2006) for extensive
reviews of agent-based models in ﬁnance; recent overviews stressing the empirical
and experimental validation of agent-based models are Lux (2009) and Hommes
and Wagener (2009).
An important result in asset pricing models with heterogeneous beliefs is that
non-rational traders, such as technical analysts extrapolating past price trends, may
survive evolutionary competition. These results contradict the hypothesis that ir-
rational traders will be driven out of the market by rational arbitrageurs, who
trade against them and earn higher proﬁts and accumulate higher wealth (Fried-
man, 1953). In most asset pricing models with heterogeneous beliefs, irrational
chartists can survive because evolutionary selection is driven by short run prof-
2itability. The role of memory or time horizon in the evolutionary ﬁtness measure
underlying strategy selection has hardly been studied in the literature however.
LeBaron (2001, 2002) are among the few papers that have addressed the role of
investor’s time horizon in learning and strategy selection in an agent-based ﬁnancial
market. It has been argued that investors’ time horizon is related to whether they
believe that the world is stationary or non-stationary. In a stationary world agents
should use all available information in learning and strategy selection, while if one
views the world as constantly in a state of change, then it will be better to use
time series reaching a shorter length into the past. One of LeBaron’s main ﬁndings
is that in a world where more agents have a long-memory horizon the volatility of
asset price ﬂuctuations is smaller. Stated diﬀerently, long-horizon investors make
the market more stable, while short-horizon investors contribute to excess volatility
and prevent asset prices to converge to the rational, fundamental benchmark.
Another contribution along these lines is Brock and Hommes (1999), who use
a simple, tractable asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs to investigate
the eﬀect of memory in the ﬁtness measure for strategy selection. In contrast
to LeBaron (2001, 2002) they ﬁnd that more memory in strategy selection may
destabilize asset price dynamics.
Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) provide analytical results for dynamics of adap-
tive learning when the learning rule has ﬁnite memory. These authors focus on the
case of learning a stochastic steady state. Although their work is not done in a
heterogeneous agent setting, the results are interesting for our analysis. Their fun-
damental outcome is that the expectational stability principle, which plays a central
role in stability of adaptive learning, as discussed e.g. in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001), retains its importance in the analysis of incomplete learning, though it takes
a new form. Their main result is that expectational stability guarantees stationary
dynamics under learning with ﬁnite memory, with unbiased forecasts but higher
price volatility than under complete learning with inﬁnite memory.
Chiarella et al. (2006) study the eﬀect of the time horizon in technical trading
3rules upon the stability in a dynamic ﬁnancial market model with fundamentalist
and chartists. The chartist demand is governed by the diﬀerence between the cur-
rent price and a (long-run) moving average. One of their main results is that an
increase of the window length of the moving average rule can destabilize an oth-
erwise stable system, leading to more complicated, even chaotic behaviour. The
analysis of the corresponding stochastic model was able to explain various mar-
ket price phenomena, including temporary bubbles, sudden market crashes, price
resistance and price switching between diﬀerent levels.
The aim of our paper is thus to study the role of memory or time horizon
in evolutionary strategy selection in a simple, analytically tractable asset pricing
model with heterogeneous beliefs. We shall analyze the eﬀects of additional memory
in the ﬁtness measure on evolutionary adaptive systems and the consequences for
survival of technical trading strategies. By complementing the stability analysis
with local bifurcation theory (see Kuznetsov (2004) for an extensive mathematical
treatment), we will be able to analyze the eﬀects of adding diﬀerent amounts of
memory to the ﬁtness measure on stability in a standard asset pricing model with
heterogeneous beliefs.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Chapter 2 an adaptive belief system
is presented in its general form. In Chapter 3 an ABS with two types of agents
and costs for information gathering is examined. In Chapter 4 we investigate the
stability of the fundamental steady state in a more generalized framework without
information costs. In Chapter 5 our theoretical ﬁndings with respect to memory
are examined numerically in an example with three strategies. The ﬁnal section
concludes and proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 Adaptive Belief Systems
An adaptive belief system is a standard discounted value asset pricing model de-
rived from mean-variance maximization with heterogeneous beliefs about future
4asset prices. We shall brieﬂy recall the model as in Brock and Hommes (1998); for
a recent more detailed discussion see e.g. Hommes and Wagener (2009).
2.1 The asset pricing model
Agents can either invest in a risk free asset or in a risky asset. The risk free asset
is in inﬁnite elastic supply and pays a ﬁxed rate of return r; the risky asset is in
ﬁxed supply zs and pays uncertain dividend. Let pt be the price per share of the
risky asset at time t, yt the stochastic dividend process of the risky asset and zt be
the number of shares of risky assets purchased at date t. Then wealth dynamics is
given by
Wt+1 = (1 + r)Wt + (pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt)zt. (2.1)
There are H diﬀerent types of trading strategies. Let Eht and Vht denote forecasts
of trader type h, with h = 1,...,H, about conditional expectation and conditional
variance, which is based on a publicly available information set of past prices and
past dividends. Demand zh,t of a trader of type h for the risky asset is derived from










where a is the risk aversion parameter. Then the demand zh,t is given by
zh,t =
Eh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt]
aVh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt]
. (2.3)
Let zs denote the supply of outside risky shares per investor, assumed to be con-
stant, and let nh,t denote the fraction of type h at date t. Then equality of the




Eh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt]
aVh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt]
= z
s. (2.4)
We shall assume the conditional variance Vh,t = σ2 to be constant and equal for all
types1, thus the equilibrium pricing equation is given by
(1 + r)pt =
H X
h=1
nh,tEh,t[pt+1 + yt+1] − aσ
2z
s. (2.5)
As in Brock and Hommes (1998) we focus on the case of zero outside supply,
i.e. zs = 0. It is well known that, if all agents are rational, the asset price is given







(1 + r)k . (2.6)
The price p∗
t is called the fundamental price. The properties of p∗
t depend upon
the stochastic dividend process yt. We focus on the case of IID dividend process yt










It will be convenient to work with the deviation from the fundamental price
xt = pt − p
∗. (2.8)
Beliefs of type h satisfy the following assumptions
[B1] Vh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt] = σ2,
[B2] Eh,t[yt+1] = Et[yt+1] = ¯ y,
1Gaunersdorfer (2000) investigates the case with time varying beliefs about variances and
shows that the asset price dynamics are quite similar. Chiarella and He (2002, 2003) investigate
the model with heterogeneous risk aversion coeﬃcients.
6[B3] Eh,t[pt+1] = Et[p∗
t+1] + fh(xt−1,...,xt−L) = p∗ + fh(xt−1,...,xt−L).
Assumption [B1] says that beliefs about conditional variance are equal and constant
for all types. According to assumption [B2] expectations about future dividends
yt+1 are the same and correct for all trader types. According to assumption [B3],
traders of type h believe that in a heterogeneous world the price may deviate from
its fundamental value p∗
t by some function fh = fh(xt−1,...,xt−L) of past deviations.
The function fh represents agent type h’s view of the world.
Brock and Hommes (1998) investigated evolutionary competition between sim-
ple linear forecasting rules with only one lag
fh,t = ghxt−1 + bh, (2.9)
where gh is the trend and bh is the bias of trader type h. If bh = 0 we call an
agent h a pure trend chaser if gh > 0 and a contrarian if gh < 0. In the special
case gh = 0 and bh = 0 trader of type h is a fundamentalist, believing that price
returns to its fundamental value.
An important and convenient consequence of the assumptions [B1]-[B3] is that
the heterogeneous agent market equilibrium (2.5) can be reformulated in devia-
tions from the fundamental price. The fact that the fundamental price satisﬁes
(1 + r)p∗ = Et[pt+1 + yt+1] yields the equilibrium equation in deviations from the
fundamental value




2.2 Evolutionary ﬁtness with memory
The evolutionary part of the model describes how beliefs are updated, i.e. how the
fractions nh,t of trader types in the market evolve over time. Fractions are updated
according to an evolutionary ﬁtness measure Uh,t. The fractions of agents choosing






The intensity of choice parameter β ≥ 0 measures how sensitive the traders are to
selecting the optimal prediction strategy. The extreme case β = 0 corresponds to
the case where agents do not switch and all fractions are ﬁxed and equal 1/H. The
other extreme case β = ∞ corresponds to the case where all traders immediately
switch to the optimal strategy. An increase in the intensity of choice β represents
an increase in the degree of rationality with respect to evolutionary selection of
trading strategies. One of the main results of Brock and Hommes (1998) is that a
rational route to randomness occurs, that is, as the intensity of choice increases the
fundamental steady state becomes unstable and a bifurcation route to complicated,
chaotic asset price ﬂuctuations arises. The key question to be addressed in this
paper is whether more memory is stabilizing or destabilizing. In particular, we are
interested in the question how memory in the ﬁtness measure aﬀects the primary
bifurcation towards instability and how it aﬀects the rational route to randomness.
A natural candidate for evolutionary ﬁtness is a weighted average of current
realized proﬁts πht and last period ﬁtness Uh,t−1
Uh,t = γπh,t + wUh,t−1
= γ

(pt + yt − Rpt−1)




where R = 1 + r, Ch ≥ 0 is an average per period cost of obtaining forecasting
strategy h, and w ∈ [0,1) is a memory parameter measuring how quickly past
realized ﬁtness is discounted for strategy selection. The parameter γ in (2.12) has
been introduced to distinguish between two important cases in the literature. Brock
and Hommes (1998) proposed the case γ = 1, implying that the weights given to
past proﬁts decline exponentially, more precisely realized proﬁts k−periods ago get
8weight wk; Brock and Hommes (1998) however, as well as almost all subsequent
literature, focus the analysis on the case without memory, i.e., w = 0, with ﬁtness
equal to current realized proﬁt2. An advantage of this case γ = 1 is that w = 1
corresponds to the benchmark where ﬁtness equals the accumulated excess proﬁt
of the risky asset over the risk free asset3. A disadvantage however is that for γ = 1
the weights are not normalized, but rather sum up to 1/(1 − w). The second case
studied in the literature assumes γ = 1 − w, corresponding to the case where the
weights are normalized to 1. Note that for w = 1/T and γ = 1 − 1/T, this case
reduces to a T−period average (see e.g. LeBaron (2001) and Diks and van der
Weide (2005)). We will refer to the case γ = 1 as cumulative ﬁtness and to the
case γ = 1 − w as normalized ﬁtness4. An important diﬀerence between these two
cases is the fact that in the case with cumulative ﬁtness, the current realized proﬁts
πht (getting weight 1) always get more weight than past ﬁtness Uh,t−1 (which gets
weight (0 ≤ w ≤ 1), regardless of the memory level w. In contrast, in the case with
normalized ﬁtness high memory (w > 0.5) gives more weight (w) to past ﬁtness
Uh,t−1 than to current proﬁts πht (which gets weight 1 − w). Notice that the two
diﬀerent ﬁtness measures lead to the same distribution of the relative weights over
past proﬁts. Stated diﬀerently, the relative contribution of current proﬁts to overall
ﬁtness is the same for both ﬁtness measures. The diﬀerence between the ﬁtness
measures however lies in the direct, absolute eﬀect of current realized proﬁts on
strategy selection. In the case of normalized ﬁtness, the absolute weight given to
current realized proﬁt (1 − w) vanishes as memory w approaches 1. In contrast,
in the case of cumulative ﬁtness, the direct, absolute eﬀect of current realized
proﬁts on strategy selection remains non-neglible as memory w approaches 1. As
2It is interesting to note that Anufriev and Hommes (2009) ﬁt an evolutionary selection model
to data from laboratory experiments and use a memory parameter w = 0.7.
3There is a large related literature on wealth-driven selection models with heterogeneous in-
vestors, with fractions of each type determined by relative wealth. See e.g. Anufriev (2008) and
Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006) for some recent contributions and Chiarella et al. (2009) and Hens
and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2009) for extensive up to date reviews.
4This terminology is similar to that used in the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning
in games literature (e.g. Camerer and Ho (1999) and Camerer (2003)), where a parameter moves
from 0 to 1 between the extremes of cumulative and average reinforcement.
9we will see, these diﬀerences will lead to diﬀerent stability results for evolutionary
selection5.
Fitness (2.12) can be rewritten in deviations from the fundamental as
Uh,t = γ

(xt − Rxt−1 + δt)







where δt = p∗
t + yt − Et−1[p∗
t + yt] is a martingale diﬀerence sequence, which
represents intrinsic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. The Adaptive Belief
System (ABS) with linear forecasting rules, in deviations from the fundamental, is
given as
(1 + r)xt =
H X
h=1









(xt − Rxt−1 + δt)








where an additional noise term εt, e.g. representing a small fraction of noise traders,
has been added to the pricing equation and will be used in some stochastic simula-
tions below. A special case, the deterministic skeleton, arises when all noise terms
are set to zero. In order to understand the properties of the general stochastic
model it is important to understand the properties of the deterministic skeleton.
5The diﬀerence between cumulative ﬁtness versus normalized ﬁtness as expressed through the
weighting coeﬃcients γ = 1 versus γ = 1 − w is related to the more general issue of whether
one should use a normalization of the ﬁtness measure Uh,t. An advantage of normalization is
that one can compare the magnitude of the intensity of choice parameter across diﬀerent ﬁtness
measures and market settings. In general it is not clear however, how exactly a ﬁtness measure
should be normalized, especially when the ﬁtness (such as realized proﬁts) may attain (arbitrarily
large) positive as well as negative values. The normalization itself may aﬀect e.g. the primary
bifurcation towards instability. The cases γ = 1 and γ = 1 − w of the ﬁtness measure in (2.12)
may be seen as two simple parameterizations of a cumulative and a normalized ﬁtness measure.
103 Two types of agents and information costs





f1,t = g1xt−1, 0 ≤ g1 < 1,
f2,t = g2xt−1, 1 < g2.
(3.1)
Type 1 believes in mean reversion, that the price will converge to its fundamen-
tal value. In the special case g1 = 0, type 1 becomes a pure fundamentalists, as
in Brock and Hommes (1998). In contrast, type 2 believes that any price devi-
ation from the fundamental will increase6. The dynamics in deviations from the
fundamental is described by the following system
















where C2 = 0, but C1 = C > 0 is the information gathering costs for fundamen-
talists that agents of type 1 must pay per period. These costs reﬂect the eﬀort
investors incur to collect information about economic fundamentals7.
6Boswijk et al. (2007) estimated this ABS with two types of investors using yearly S&P 500
data and found coeﬃcients of g1 ≈ 0.8 and g2 ≈ 1.15, thus suggesting behavioral heterogeneity.
7In our formulation of the model in deviations from the fundamental it may seem that both
predictors make use of knowledge of the fundamental. However, this example is equivalent to the
case where type 1 has a mean reversion forecast towards a known fundamental, while type 2 uses
a linear forecast, with trend parameter g2 > R, not related to the fundamental.
11We can rewrite the system above as a ﬁve-dimensional map
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. (3.5)
The following theorem describes the results concerning existence and stability of
the steady states (see Appendix A for the proof).
Theorem 3.1. (Existence and stability of the steady states) Let us denote
the fundamental steady state as xf = 0, and non-fundamental steady states as
x+ = x∗ > 0 and x− = −x∗ < 0, where
x
∗ =

















Then three cases are possible:
(i) 1 < g2 < R: the fundamental steady state xf is the unique steady state and
it is globally stable;
(ii) R ≤ g2 < 2R−g1, the system displays a pitchfork bifurcation at β = β∗ such
that
– for 0 < β < β∗ xf is unique and stable;
– for β > β∗ there are three steady states: xf, x+ and x−; the fundamental
steady state xf is unstable;
12(iii) g2 ≥ 2R − g1: there are always three steady states: xf, x+ and x−; the
fundamental steady state xf is unstable.
When the trend chasers extrapolate only weakly, i.e. 1 < g2 < R, the funda-
mental steady state xf = 0 is globally stable. If C = 0 then the two types of agents
are equally represented in the market, i.e. n1 = n2 = 1/2 for any value of β, because
the diﬀerence in ﬁtnesses U2 − U1 = 0 at x = 0. If agents on average extrapolate
very strongly, i.e. (g1 + g2)/2 > R, the fundamental steady state is unstable and
there are always two additional non-fundamental steady states x = x+ > 0 and
x = x− < 0, even when there are no information costs. The case with strongly
extrapolating trend chasers, i.e. R < g2 < 2R−g1, is the most interesting. If there
are no information costs, C = 0, the fundamental steady state is stable for all
values of β and agents are equally distributed over the two types due to equality of
proﬁts. But when C > 0 the fundamental steady state is stable only if the agents
are not too sensitive to switch the prediction strategy, i.e. for β < β∗. As the
intensity of choice increases (β > β∗) most of the agents switch to use the cheap
prediction rule, because if the price is in a small neighborhood of its fundamental
value then due to information costs the ﬁrst type of agents have lower proﬁts and
for large β a majority of agents switches to the trend extrapolating strategy.
It can be seen immediately from expressions (3.6) and (3.7) how memory aﬀects
the primary bifurcation of the system. In the case with normalized ﬁtness (γ =
1 − w) memory does not aﬀect the stability. However, in the case of accumulated
proﬁts (γ = 1) and information gathering costs for fundamentalists, memory indeed
aﬀects the stability and in fact it destabilizes the system, i.e. with more memory
the primary bifurcation occurs earlier.
133.1 Simulation 2 type example
As a typical example consider an ABS with the following two prediction rules
f1,t = 0.5xt−1, (3.8)
f2,t = 1.2xt−1. (3.9)
Traders of the ﬁrst type believe that the next period deviation of the price from
the fundamental will be two times less than in the current period, whereas traders
of the second type predict an increase in deviation of the price from fundamental.
It follows from Theorem 3.1 that the fundamental steady state xf = 0 is unique
and stable for β ∈ (0,β∗), with β∗(w) = 1.79(1 − w)/γ. When the parameter β
passes the critical value β∗, the fundamental steady state looses stability due to a
pitchfork bifurcation and two new stable equilibria of the price dynamics appear.
Next consider the cases with two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the ﬁtness measure:
cumulative and normalized ﬁtness.
Cumulative ﬁtness (γ = 1). In the case with accumulated proﬁts, i.e. when γ =
1, the pitchfork bifurcation curve is given by β∗(w) = 1.79(1−w), which is declining
with respect to the memory parameter. It means that memory destabilizes the price
dynamics: the larger w the earlier the primary bifurcation occurs.
Fig. 1 illustrates the dynamics without memory (w = 0, left panel) and with
memory (w = 0.5, right panel). In both cases a rational route to randomness, that
is, a bifurcation route to complicated dynamics as the intensity of choice increases,
occurs. Notice that, with memory in the ﬁtness measure, the temporary bubbles
and crashes in the price series occur less frequently, but when they occur they last
longer with much larger deviations from the fundamental benchmark.
Normalized ﬁtness (γ = 1−w). In the case with normalized ﬁtness, i.e. when

























































Figure 1: The case of two types of prediction rules and accumulated proﬁts (γ = 1).
The left column corresponds to w = 0, the right column corresponds to w = 0.5. Upper
ﬁgures display bifurcation diagrams with respect to β. Time series of the price deviation
are represented by the middle ﬁgures (without noise) and the lower ﬁgures (with noise).
Belief parameters are: g1 = 0.5 and g2 = 1.2; the other parameters are: β = 4, R = 1.1,
C = 1 and d = 1.
does not aﬀect the stability of the fundamental steady state. Fig. 2 illustrates
the dynamics without memory (w = 0, left panel) and with memory (w = 0.8,
right panel). Although less pronounced, memory has a similar eﬀect on price
ﬂuctuations: with memory in the ﬁtness measure, the temporary bubbles and
15crashes in the price series occur less frequently, but once started bubbles last longer

























































Figure 2: The normalized ﬁtness measure case (γ = 1 − w): time series of the price
deviation from its fundamental value for diﬀerent levels of the memory. Belief parameters
are: g1 = 0.5 and g2 = 1.2; the other parameters are: β = 4, R = 1.1, C = 1 and d = 1.
164 Stability in a more general framework
Brock and Hommes (1998) stressed the importance of simple forecasting rules,
because it is unlikely that enough traders will coordinate on a complicated rule for it
to have an impact in real markets. The learning to forecast laboratory experiments
of Hommes et al. (2005) also show that simple, linear forecasting rules with only a
few lags describe individual forecasting behavior surprisingly well. In this section,
we investigate the role of memory in an ABS with an arbitrary number H of linear
forecasting rules with one lag, i.e.
fi,t = gixt−1 + bi, gi,bi ∈ R, i = 1,...,H. (4.1)


















= γπh,t + wUh,t−2. (4.4)
with d = aσ2. Equation (4.2) can be rewritten as a (H+3)-dimensional map
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. (4.5)
The following theorem describes the results concerning existence and stability
of the fundamental steady state (see Appendix B for the proof).
17Theorem 4.1. (Existence and stability of the fundamental steady state)
Assume that
1. The average bias equals zero, i.e.,
PH
i=1 bi = 0;





3. The mean trend is not too strong, i.e. |¯ g| = | 1
H
PH
i=1 gi| < R.
Then the fundamental price xf = 0 is a steady state of (4.5). The fundamental
steady state is stable for 0 ≤ β < βNS, where
βNS =
aσ2(R − ¯ gw)
RV γ
> 0. (4.6)
At the value β = βNS the steady state loses stability due to a Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation. For β > βNS the fundamental steady state is unstable8.
The assumptions that the average bias is zero seems reasonable, as there is no
a priori reason why the average bias would be negative or positive9. The other two
assumptions, that there is at least one non-zero bias and that the average trend over
all rules is not too strong, also seem plausible. The theorem says that, under these
assumptions, the dynamic behavior of the price of the risky asset is independent
of the number of agent’s strategies, but rather depends on the mean value ¯ g of the
trend extrapolating coeﬃcients gh and the spread V of the biases bh. The larger the
absolute average trend |¯ g|, the lower βNS and the earlier the primary bifurcation
occurs; if the trend chasers on average extrapolate more heavily away from the
fundamentals, the system destabilizes faster. Similarly, the greater the variance V
in biases, the lower βNS and the bifurcation again occurs earlier; if there is more
variability among biased traders, the price dynamics becomes unstable earlier. Note
8Note that in the special case V = 0 all biases equal zero, and if |¯ g| < R the fundamental
steady state is stable for all values of β and w.
9If the average bias is non-zero and close to 0, the fundamental price is not a steady state but
the system has a steady state close to the fundamental. In that case, a stability analysis becomes
much more cumbersome however.
18that for the special case ¯ g = 0 and γ = 1, memory does not aﬀect the stability of
the fundamental steady state, since βNS = aσ2/V (cf. Brock and Hommes, 1998).
Role of the parameter γ. In the case γ = 1, i.e. in the case of cumulative











as illustrated in Figure 3 (left panel). The slope of the line depends on the sign of
¯ g. If agents on average extrapolate positively, then the line is decreasing and the
bifurcation w.r.t. β comes earlier with more memory. The intuition is that positive
trend extrapolation reinforces market movements away from the fundamentals and
the system destabilizes faster. On the other hand, if agents on average are contrar-
ians extrapolating negatively, then (4.7) is an increasing line and the bifurcation
w.r.t. β comes later with more memory. Here the intuition is that contrarian be-
havior counter-balances market movements away from the fundamentals and the
system destabilizes slower.















Figure 3: Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curves βNS in (4.6) for diﬀerent values of the
parameters γ and ¯ g: dotted lines correspond to the case ¯ g > 0, while solid lines correspond
to the case ¯ g < 0. For the case with γ = 1 (left panel) the bifurcation curves are straight
lines, whereas for γ = 1 − w (right panel) they are hyperbolas. In the case γ = 1 (left
panel) and ¯ g > 0 memory has a destabilizing eﬀect on the dynamics, i.e. the bifurcation
w.r.t. β comes earlier. In contrast, in the case γ = 1 − w (right panel) more memory
always has a stabilizing eﬀect.
In the case with normalized ﬁtness, γ = 1 − w, memory is always stabilizing.
19The Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve (4.6) becomes a hyperbola for both positive
and negative values of ¯ g (see Figure 3, right panel):
βNS =
aσ2(R − ¯ gw)
RV (1 − w)
. (4.8)
A higher memory strength means more weight on cumulative past ﬁtness and less
weight on current realized proﬁts. Hence, by increasing the level of memory in
the system the contemporaneous destabilizing trend extrapolation is not power-
ful enough any more to prevail, irrespective of the direction of the average trend
extrapolation ¯ g, and the system stabilizes.
5 Numerical simulation of a 3-type example
In this section we discuss a simple, but typical ABS with three types of traders
in order to illustrate the diﬀerences in impact of the memory strength on the
stability of the fundamental price in the two cases of cumulative ﬁtness (γ = 1)
and normalized ﬁtness (γ = 1 − w).
Consider the ABS with the following three types of prediction rules
f1,t = 0, (5.1)
f2,t = 1.2xt−1 − 0.2, (5.2)
f3,t = 0.9xt−1 + 0.2. (5.3)
The second and the third types are symmetrically opposite biased positive trend
extrapolators, the ﬁrst type are fundamentalists. The remaining parameters are
ﬁxed at: R = 1.1, aσ2 = 1. Since ¯ g = 0.7 < R, V = 0.08/3 6= 0 and biases sum up
to zero, according to Theorem 4.1, the fundamental steady state looses stability in





20The case γ = 1. In the case with cumulative ﬁtness, i.e. when γ = 1, the
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve is a declining straight line:
βNS = 37.5 − 23.9w. (5.5)







Figure 4: Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve (left panel) and bifurcation diagram with
respect to the memory parameter w (right panel) for the model with three types of
agents and ﬁtness given by accumulated proﬁts, i.e. γ = 1. Belief parameters are:
g1 = 0,b1 = 0; g2 = 1.1,b2 = −0.2; and g3 = 0.9,b3 = 0.2; other parameters are:
R = 1.1,aσ2 = 1 and β = 25 (for the right panel). The Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve
divides the (w,β)−plane into two regions; for the parameter values in the upper region
the fundamental steady state is unstable, while for the parameter values in the lower
region it is stable.
As can be seen from Figure 4, in this case memory destabilizes the price dynamics;
with higher memory strength the bifurcation occurs earlier, i.e. for smaller values
of β. Since both non-fundamentalist agents extrapolate positively, and thus the
average trend extrapolation is also positive, in accordance with our ﬁndings from
Section 4, the extrapolation of trend reinforces markets movements away from the
fundamentals and the bifurcation line is thus decreasing. In addition, it can be ob-
served in the bifurcation diagram of Figure 4 (right panel) how, for a ﬁxed β-value,
the fundamental steady state becomes unstable and complicated, chaotic price
movements arise as the memory parameter w increases. Figure 4 (right panel) also
illustrates that the amplitude of price ﬂuctuation increases as memory increases,
in accordance with our earlier ﬁnding that bubbles last longer with more memory.
21The case γ = 1 − w. In the case with normalized ﬁtness, i.e. when γ = 1 − w,





As can be seen from Figure 5 (left panel), more memory now stabilizes the price







Figure 5: Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve (left) and bifurcation diagram with respect
to the memory (right) for the model with three types of agents’ strategies and normalized
ﬁtness measure, i.e. γ = 1−w. Belief parameters are: g1 = 0,b1 = 0; g2 = 1.1,b2 = −0.2;
and g3 = 0.9,b3 = 0.2; other parameters are: R = 1.1,d = 1 and β = 70 (for the right
ﬁgure). The Neimark-Sacker bifurcation curve divides the (w,β)−plane into two regions;
for the parameter values in the upper region the fundamental steady state is unstable,
while for the parameter values in the lower region it is stable.
dynamics; an increase in the memory strength makes the bifurcation occur later,
i.e. for larger values of β. Even when the traders are on average positive trend
extrapolators (with some bias), if the weight on cumulative past ﬁtness (the mem-
ory strength w) is high enough compared to the weight on current realized proﬁts
(γ = 1 − w), the dynamics is stable. Indeed it can be observed in the bifurcation
diagram in Figure 5 (right panel) that, for a given β, the dynamics stabilizes from
chaotic movements (interspersed with stable cycles) for low values of the memory
parameter w to a stable fundamental steady state when memory w is suﬃciently
large.
226 Conclusion
We have investigated how memory aﬀects the stability of evolutionary selection
dynamics in a simple, analytically tractable asset pricing model with heterogeneous
beliefs. By complementing the stability analysis with local bifurcation theory, we
were able to analyze the eﬀects of adding diﬀerent amounts of memory to the
ﬁtness measure on the stability of the fundamental steady state. Whether memory
is stabilizing or destabilizing depends in general on three key factors: (1) whether
we have a ﬁtness measure of cumulative proﬁts or a normalized ﬁtness measure;
(2) the ecology of forecasting rules, in particular the average strength of trend
extrapolation and the spread in biased forecasts, and (3) whether or not costs for
information gathering of economic fundamentals have to be incurred.
When there are costs for gathering fundamental information, more memory in
the ﬁtness measure does not stabilize the dynamics. In the case with normalized
ﬁtness, due to the information gathering costs, memory has no eﬀect on stability;
in the case of cumulative ﬁtness, when there are information gathering costs for
fundamentalists, more memory is destabilizing.
We have also studied the model with an arbitrary number of linear forecasting
rules with one lag and no costs for information gathering. The stability depends
critically on the ecology of forecasting rules. In particular, the system may become
unstable more easily when the average trend parameter and or the variability of bi-
ased forecasts become larger. How memory aﬀects the stability of the fundamental
steady state depends again on whether we have cumulative ﬁtness or normalized
proﬁts. In the case of cumulative ﬁtness, the eﬀect of memory on the stability fur-
ther depends on the direction of average trend extrapolation. If agents on average
are contrarians, extrapolating negatively, more memory stabilizes the system; if on
the other hand agents on average extrapolate positively, memory destabilizes the
system. In contrast, in the case with a normalized ﬁtness measure more memory
is always stabilizing.
23Our theoretical results show that the stability of evolutionary selection depends
critically on behavioral assumptions of how exactly agents switch between diﬀerent
strategies. In particular, it is critical how much weight agents put on recent realized
proﬁts compared to past accumulated proﬁts. The more weight they put on the
most recent observation, the more easily the system may destabilize. Future re-
search with laboratory experiments with human subjects may shed light on which
behavioral assumptions ﬁt individual behavior in strategy selection more closely
and, in particular, how much weight individuals put on most recent observations.
A Proof of Theorem 3.1























It is easy to see that the fundamental steady state xf = 0 always exists. The

















Note that if (R − g1)/(g2 − R) ≤ 0 there are no solutions for this equation. If we
take into account that g1 < 1 then we can conclude that for 1 < g2 < R the map
(3.2)-(3.4) is contracting and has a unique globally stable steady state xf = 0.












which has solutions x = ±x∗, when its right hand side is positive. It is satisﬁed for
24β > β∗ in (3.7) if R ≤ g2 < 2R − g1, and for any positive β if g2 ≥ 2R − g1. Now
the statements about existence of equilibria in (i), (ii) and (iii) are proved.
In order to explore the stability of the fundamental steady state we need to
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 > 0. (A.6)
Note that all eigenvalues are real and non-negative, so the only bifurcation that
may occur is a pitchfork bifurcation, which happens if
λ5 = 1 ⇔ β = β
∗. (A.7)
This means that if g2 ∈ [R,2R − g1) for β ∈ (0,β∗) there exists a unique stable
fundamental steady state, and at the critical parameter value β = β∗ two non-
fundamental steady states occur due to a pitchfork bifurcation.
25B Proof of Theorem 4.1
Note that at the fundamental steady state all ﬁtnesses are equal to zero, i.e. U∗
h = 0
for h = 1,..,H, which implies that all fraction are equal, n∗
h = 1/H. Therefore the








∗ + bh) (B.1)
and thus
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It is clear that the fundamental steady state exists if and only if
PH
h=1 bh = 0.
The Jacobian of (4.5) computed at the fundamental steady state is given by
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d 0 J1,1 ··· J1,H
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    





, s = 1,...,H.









The characteristic equation (B.3) has H+3 roots, where H+1 of them are inside
26the unit circle; λ3 = λ4 = 0 and λ5 = ... = λH+3 = w < 1, while the other two are
roots of the polynomial p(λ) and thus they determine stability of the steady state.
If p(λ) has at least one root outside of the unit circle, the steady state is unstable.
We denote roots of p(λ) as λ1 and λ2.
Let us now explore three cases when one or two roots of p(λ) are crossing a unit
circle:
1. λ1 = 1, pitchfork bifurcation,
p(1) = 9d(R − ¯ g)(1 − w) + 9V (R − 1)γβ.
If V = 0 then p(1) > 0 for w ∈ [0,1) and |¯ g| < R. If V > 0 then
p(1) = 0 ⇔ β =
d(1 − w)(¯ g − R)
V (R − 1)γ
< 0 for ¯ g < R, (B.4)
which means that this type of bifurcation cannot occur in the system.
2. λ1 = −1, period doubling bifurcation,
p(−1) = 9d(R + ¯ g)(1 + w) + 9V (R + 1)γβ.
If V = 0 then p(−1) > 0 for w ∈ [0,1) and |¯ g| < R. If V > 0 then
p(−1) = 0 ⇔ β = βPD = −
4(¯ g + R)(1 + w)
V (1 + R)(1 − w)
< 0,
which means that this type of bifurcation can not occur in the system either.
3. λ1,2 = µ1 ± µ2i, where µ2 > 0 and µ2
1 + µ2
2 = 1, Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.





2 = λ1λ2 =
d¯ gw + RV βγ
dR
= 1. (B.5)
If V = 0, the equation (B.5) does not have solutions for w ∈ [0,1) and
27|¯ g| < R. Therefore all eigenvalues corresponding to the fundamental steady
state are inside the unit circle and thus the steady state is stable for w ∈ [0,1)
and β ≥ 0.
If V > 0, we obtain from (B.5) the equation of the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation
curve
βNS =
d(R − w¯ g)
RV γ
. (B.6)
We have to make sure that µ2 6= 0 or equally µ2
2 > 0. Since µ2
1 + µ2
2 = 1 the
latter inequality holds if µ2





d(¯ g + Rw) + βV γ
2dR
> 0.
To make sure that µ2
1 < 1 we need to check the inequality
d(¯ g + Rw) + V βγ
2dR
< 1.
Together with (B.6) it implies
w(R
2 − ¯ g) < R(2R − 1 − ¯ g), (B.7)
which is satisﬁed for |¯ g| < R and any value of w ∈ [0,1).
Our analysis shows that the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is the only bifurcation that
occurs in the system. It happens for β = βNS as in (B.6) and leads to a loss of
stability of the fundamental steady state.
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